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ABOLISH DISTRICTS 
CORINNA BARRETT LAIN* 
 People are talking about gerrymandering.  Partisan gerry-
mandering, racial gerrymandering, prison-based gerrymander-
ing.1  Gerrymandering jigsaws, gerrymandering art shows, ger-
rymandered news.2  When gerrymandering hits every major 
media outlet from The New York Times to The Wall Street Journal 
to The Economist to Rolling Stone, it’s a problem.3  When it hits 
The Daily Show, it’s a national disgrace.4 
 As a Virginian, I come from a long line of gerrymanderers, 
but what we are seeing today would make even Patrick Henry 
blush.5  Today’s gerrymandering has made a mockery of our de-
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1 ERIK J. ENGSTROM, PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF 
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2013); Luke Rosiak, Gerrymandering Partisan Lock: Shape of 
Things to Come, WASH. TIMES (Nov. 22, 2012), 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/nov/22/partisan-lock-shape-of-
things-to-come/; What is Racial Gerrymandering and Why Should I care? SOUTHERN 
COALITION FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE (Oct. 11, 2013), 
http://www.southerncoalition.org/what-is-racial-gerrymandering-and-why-should-i-
care/; Districting by Pigmentation, NEWSWEEK (July 7, 2010), 
http://www.newsweek.com/districting-pigmentation-194474; Prison-Based Gerry-
mandering, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/27/opinion/prison-based-
gerrymandering.html?_r=0. 
2 See Chris Kirk, Can You Solve Slate’s Gerrymandering Jigsaw Puzzle?, SLATE 
(Aug. 21, 2013), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/map_of_the_week/2013/08/gerry
mandering_jigsaw_puzzle_game_put_the_congressional_districts_back_together.html; 
Daily Show Jason Jones and the Art of Gerrymandering, KICK! MAKING POLITICS FUN 
(Dec. 11, 2013), http://rackjite.com/daily-show-jason-jones-art-gerrymandering/; 
David Carr, It’s Not Just Political Districts, Our News is Gerrymandered, Too, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 11, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/12/business/media/when-our-news-is-
gerrymandered-too.html.  
3 See Sam Wang, The Great Gerrymander of 2012, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 2, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/03/opinion/sunday/the-great-gerrymander-of-
2012.html?pagewanted=all; The Gerrymander Scandal, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 7, 2001), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1005097828258686800.html?dsk=y; M.S., How 
Can Republicans be Both Safer and More Numerous?, THE ECONOMIST (Oct. 3, 2013), 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2013/10/gerrymandering; 
Tim Dickinson, How Republicans Rig the Game, ROLLING STONE (Nov. 11, 2013), 
http://m.rollingstone.com/politics/news/how-republicans-rig-the-game-20131111.  
4 American Horrible Story – Gerrymandering, THE DAILY SHOW (Dec. 10, 2013), 
http://www.thedailyshow.com/watch/tue-december-10-2013/american-horrible-
story---gerrymandering.  
5 Political lore maintains that Patrick Henry became the first gerrymanderer 
when he redesigned a 1789 Virginia congressional district in an attempt to help 
James Monroe defeat James Madison, but recent scholarship calls this account into 
question.  See Thomas Rogers Hunter, The First Gerrymander?: Patrick Henry, James 
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mocracy in ways the Framers could not even dream about.  And 
I’m close to convinced that there’s no way to cabin its destruc-
tion.   
So just as a thought experiment, I allowed myself to work 
off a clean slate—to set aside the system we have today and 
think creatively about whether a solution to this conundrum 
might exist, and what that solution might be; and then, if there 
was some sense as to what the right answer was, well maybe 
then we could start figuring out how to get there.  Here’s what I 
came up with:  abolish districts.   
Part I explains how bad the gerrymandering problem is, 
why it’s beyond fixing, and what I see as the crux of the prob-
lem—single-member, winner-take-all districts.  Part II moves 
from problem to preferred solution—abolish single-member dis-
tricts and replace them with multi-member districts that utilize 
choice voting (aka single transferable voting), or even limited or 
cumulative voting systems, instead.  Part III offers thoughts 
about how all this might happen.  It’s short.  The main insight is 
that the federal statute that precludes states from trying such 
systems is unconstitutional, and even a Supreme Court disin-
clined to enter political thickets may well agree.  But it bears re-
peating that the focus of this essay is not the how, but the what.  
What is the right answer, if even there is one?  This is a thought 
experiment, a conversation starter.  So let’s get started.  
I. WHAT’S ALL THE FUSS ABOUT? 
Four million votes.  That’s the going estimate of how 
many votes were wasted—“diluted” in election law speak—by ger-
rymandering in the 2012 election.6  The entire point of gerry-
mandering is diluting votes.  The opposition party’s votes are 
crammed into districts that ensure the opposition party’s candi-
date will win by overwhelming margins—often 60% or more—
which also ensures that those votes are not in play in other dis-
tricts where they could actually matter.7  Meanwhile, the control-
ling party’s votes are spread across districts with just enough 
partisan tilt—typically 15-30%—to ensure that the controlling 
party’s candidate will win no matter how many of the opposing 
party’s voters show up.8  Welcome to the world of gerrymander-
Madison, James Monroe, and Virginia’s 1788 Congressional Districting, 9 EARLY AM. 
STUDIES: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY J. 781 (2011). 
6 See Steve Coll, Building a Better Democracy, THE NEW YORKER (Jan. 10, 2013), 
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/comment/2013/01/ending-
gerrymandering-and-building-a-better-democracy.html (discussing findings of Prince-
ton Election Consortium). 
7 See How Can Republicans be Both Safer and More Numerous?, supra note 3. 
8 See id. 
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ing, where the name of the game is wasting the opposition par-
ty’s votes, while making the most of yours. 
The 2012 election hurled gerrymandering into the spot-
light when it showed just how devastating the practice can be—
but the domino that started it all fell two years earlier.  In 2010, 
a Republican election sweep at the state level coincided with the 
decennial census to give the GOP unprecedented power in re-
drawing congressional district boundaries.9  “Democrats will not 
soon recover from what happened to them on a state level last 
night,” bragged the former executive director of REDMAP, the 
GOP’s Redistricting Majority Project.10  He was right. 
In the 2012 elections, Democratic congressional candi-
dates received around 1.4 million more votes than their Republi-
can counterparts, but Republicans lost only 8 seats in the House 
of Representatives, leaving them with a 33-seat advantage.11  
The Princeton Election Consortium concluded that 26 of those 
33 seats were gerrymandered; that is, without gerrymandering, 
the GOP still would have had a majority in the House, but it 
would have been a 5-seat advantage rather than 33.12   
The state stats tell the tale.  In Pennsylvania, Democratic 
candidates for the House received 83,000 more votes than Re-
publican candidates, but Republicans won 13 of the state’s 18 
seats.13  In North Carolina, Democratic candidates received 
81,000 more votes than Republican candidates, but Republicans 
won 9 of the state’s 13 seats.14  In Michigan, Democratic candi-
dates received 240,000 more votes than Republican candidates, 
but Republicans won 9 of the state’s 14 seats.15  In Wisconsin, 
Democrats received 43,000 more votes than Republicans, but 
Republicans won 5 of the state’s 8 seats.16  And in Maryland, 
Democrats proved they could play the gerrymandering game 
too—Democratic candidates for the House received 750,000 
more votes than Republicans (around 63% of Maryland’s popular 
vote) but won 7 of the state’s 8 congressional seats.17   
9 See Dickinson, supra note 3 (noting that in the 2010 election “the GOP seized 
full-party control of 21 state governments—up from nine the previous year and 
enough to put the party in charge of redistricting 173 House seats.”). 
10 Id. 
11 Id.; How Can Republicans be Both Safer and More Numerous?, supra note 3. 
12 See Dickinson, supra note 3; see also Coll, supra note 6 (noting that without 
gerrymandering, the Republican advantage “would have been so narrow that Demo-
crats would have been able to get bills passed if they could hang together and get a 
handful of defectors from the other side.”).  
13 Dickinson, supra note 3. 
14 Id. 
15 Id.  
16 Id. 
17 See UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTIONS IN MARYLAND, 2012, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_House_of_Representatives_elections_in_
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All told, 47 of the representatives elected in 2012 won 
their district by a margin of 60% or more—18 Republicans, 29 
Democrats.18  And 134 won by margins in the 15-30% safe zone, 
also known as the “golden mean”—92 Republicans, 42 Demo-
crats.19  Both parties are gerrymandering their way into Con-
gress; Republicans are just better at it.   
“That’s messed up,” my 10-year-old says about the vote-
seat mismatch,20 and it is—but gerrymandering messes us up in 
other ways too.  In a world where so-called “safe seats” dominate 
the political landscape, the competition that candidates have to 
worry about is not in the general election, but in the party pri-
mary that comes before it—and that means the constituency that 
matters is not the public, but the party base.  That in turn cre-
ates a race to the ideological extremes, with elected representa-
tives quietly admitting that they’d like to be more moderate, but 
can’t for fear of getting “primaried.”21  
The result is a hot mess.  Voters lack choice.  Representa-
tives are more responsive to parties than to the people they are 
supposed to represent.  And the resulting body politic has little 
incentive for bipartisanship and compromise; indeed, the incen-
tives all run the opposite way.  Politicos warn that this is espe-
cially dangerous for American democracy because our decentral-
ized structure affords opportunities for hardliners to grind 
government to a halt, as last fall’s shutdown made painfully ob-
vious.22  Meanwhile, moderate Republicans complain that Demo-
crats aren’t the only ones hurt by gerrymandered Republican 
districts; extreme right-wing Republicans alienate them too, they 
say, and are tearing the GOP apart.23   
Maryland,_2012 (reporting popular vote tallies and results of election in aggregate 
and by seats). 
18 How Can Republicans be Both Safer and More Numerous?, supra note 3. 
19 Id. 
20 I credit Jessica Lain for the clarity that grown-ups sometimes lack. 
21 Yes, it’s a verb.  See Mark Silva, Getting Primaried: The Dreaded Verb, 
BLOOMBERG POLITICS (Dec. 14, 2012),  http://go.bloomberg.com/political-
capital/2012-12-14/getting-primaried-the-dreaded-verb/; see also Robert Draper, 
The League of Dangerous Mapmakers, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 19, 2012), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2012/10/the-league-of/309084/2/ 
(noting that there are some Republicans “who would be inclined to be more moderate, 
if they didn’t have to fear a primary challenge.”). 
22 See Ian Reifowitz, First, Kill All the “Gerrymander-ers”, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 
1, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ian-reifowitz/first-kill-all-the-
gerrymanderers_b_4017385.html (noting that “extremism . . . is especially dangerous 
because of the way our Congress was designed to function—namely that, absent a 
landslide victory, one party can make it virtually impossible to get anything done, 
even the most basic tasks like paying our bills on time.”). 
23 See comment following Coll, supra note 6 (“Don’t assume that only Democrats 
are disenfranchised in Gerrymandered Republican districts.  Moderate Republicans 
in those districts that produce extreme right wing Republican office holders are also 
marginalized.”); id. (“The creation of unassailable super-majority GOP districts has 
hurt Republicans as well as the nation.  Answerable only to the few and the extreme, 
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Unfortunately, there’s no end in sight.  Gerrymandering 
used to be about entrenching incumbents; it was a gentlemen’s 
agreement that allowed parties on both sides of the aisle to pro-
tect their own from competitive elections.24  Nowadays gerry-
mandering is about controlling the country, which means the 
stakes are higher and so is the level of politics involved.  “He who 
controls redistricting can control Congress,” wrote Karl Rove in 
201025—a recognition that has brought unprecedented involve-
ment of the national GOP in how local lawmakers draw their 
maps.26  “We have taken the initiative to retain a team of sea-
soned redistricting experts that we will make available to you at 
no cost,” wrote GOP leadership to state legislators in the wake of 
the 2010 elections.27  Some states took the help; at least one 
other, Texas, saw it as a naked power grab.28  Interestingly, one 
these Tea Party representatives have no incentive to work even within their own party 
for compromise, or for the good of the country, which is why the GOP lacks national 
coherence.  The only thing the House Republicans seem capable of producing is un-
seemly fighting…”). 
24 See Dickinson, supra note 3; Arch Puddington, To Renew American Democra-
cy, Eliminate Gerrymandering (Oct. 9, 2013), 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/blog/renew-american-democracy-eliminate-
gerrymandering#.UwGV0fMo7IU. 
25 Karl Rove, The GOP Targets State Legislatures, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 4, 2010), 
http://www.rove.com/articles/219?tr=y&auid=6021231. 
26 REDMAP was initiated in the last 5 years.  Here’s what its website had to say:  
 
As the 2010 Census approached, the RSLC [Republican State 
Leadership Committee] began planning for the subsequent election 
cycle, formulating a strategy to keep or win Republican control of 
state legislatures with the largest impact on Congressional redis-
tricting as a result of reapportionment. That effort, the REDistrict-
ing MAjority Project (REDMAP), focused critical resources on legis-
lative chambers in states projected to gain or lose Congressional 
seats in 2011 based on Census data.   
The rationale was straightforward: Controlling the redistricting 
process in these states would have the greatest impact on deter-
mining how both state legislative and congressional district 
boundaries would be drawn.  Drawing new district lines in states 
with the most redistricting activity presented an opportunity to so-
lidify conservative policymaking at the state level and maintain a 
Republican stronghold in the U.S. House of Representatives for the 
next decade. 
 
2012 REDMAP Summary Report (Jan. 4, 2013), THE REDISTRICTING MAJORITY 
PROJECT http://www.redistrictingmajorityproject.com/. 
27 See Dickinson, supra note 3 (quoting former REDMAP executive director’s let-
ter) 
28 According to one Texas Republican, the Republican National Committee (RNC) 
leadership consisted of “incredibly brilliant people who tend to think they’re right, 
and if you don’t agree with them, they don’t put much effort towards convincing you,” 
a dynamic that “rubbed raw with the leadership here in Texas.”  In the end, the Texas 
legislature basically told the GOP, “We’re Texas, and we’re gonna handle our maps”—
and they did, but the result was a disaster.  See Draper, supra note 21 (discussing 
friction between Texas and the RNC over who would control redistricting, and the liti-
gation that followed Texas’s reckless redistricting on its own). 
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scholar has argued that partisan gerrymandering is a safeguard 
of federalism because of the tremendous power that state offi-
cials wield over congressional elections29—and that would be 
true, if it weren’t for the fact that national party leaders are seiz-
ing it for their own. 
Exacerbating the problem is the fact that gerrymandering 
today is not only more important, but also easier to do.  With the 
advent of mapping software and block-by-block census data, ger-
rymandering has become an incredibly sophisticated—and accu-
rate—enterprise, allowing elected officials to create districts with 
just about any political configuration they like.30 (See the Ap-
pendix for a sampling of their work).31  The result is an inexora-
ble drive towards more safe seats.  As it currently stands, less 
than 100 of the House of Representatives’ 435 seats are competi-
tive—i.e., not controlled by one of the parties—and that number 
is dwindling.32  Political analysts estimate that in the 2014 mid-
term elections, 211 of the 234 House seats currently held by Re-
publicans will be safe seats—a whopping 90%.33   
Now that’s entrenchment, and the Republicans aren’t fin-
ished yet.  The next move on the RNC agenda is to extend the 
gerrymandering that won them the House to presidential elec-
tions.  How?  By replacing the winner-take-all approach to Elec-
toral College votes with apportionment according to congression-
al districts instead—an approach currently used by two states.34  
Proposals have already been advanced in a half-dozen states that 
swing Democrat in presidential elections but are controlled by 
Republican state legislatures.35  The move would make electing a 
Democrat for president difficult, if not impossible, even with a 
landslide of the popular vote. 
What to do.  Thus far, gerrymandering reform has in-
volved both bipartisan and nonpartisan commissions in the re-
districting process, with limited success.36  “There’s no such 
29 See Franita Tolson, Partisan Gerrymandering as a Safeguard of Federalism, 
2010 UTAH L. REV. 859 (2010). 
30 See Draper, supra note 21; Puddington, supra note 24. 
31 For those who can’t get enough, see also The 10 Most Gerrymandered Districts 
in America (Aug. 15, 2013), http://www.buzzfeed.com/qsahmed/the-10-most-
gerrymandered-districts-in-america-dh45; The Top Ten Most Gerrymandered Con-
gressional Districts in the United States (Nov. 11, 2010), 
http://pjmedia.com/zombie/2010/11/11/the-top-ten-most-gerrymandered-
congressional-districts-in-the-united-states/. 
32 See Draper, supra note 21. 
33 See Reifowitz, supra note 22. 
34 See Dickinson, supra note 3. 
35 See id. 
36 See John Fund, Next Year’s Gerrymandering Free-For-All, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 5, 
2010) 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748703506904575592760982
146100 
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thing as nonpartisan,” claims one GOP gerrymandering consult-
ant,37 and I suspect he is right.  Redistricting requires choices, 
and choices create winners and losers.  We might be able to min-
imize the influence of politics in redistricting, but I have little 
confidence in our ability to depoliticize the process.38  Recogniz-
ing the point, the Supreme Court says it cannot come up with 
judicially manageable standards for reigning in gerrymander-
ing.39  And gerrymandering shows no signs of reigning in itself.  
Houston, we have a problem. 
As I see it, the crux of the problem is not gerrymandering, 
or even redistricting—it’s districting itself.  The artificially con-
structed nature of congressional districts is what makes manipu-
lating district borders possible.  And our single-member, winner-
take-all electoral system is what makes manipulating those bor-
ders worthwhile.  Even in its natural state, the results are not 
pretty.  Minority party voters get no representation, even if they 
carry 49% of the vote.40  Racial minorities need specially drawn 
districts to be heard.41  Entrenchment and self-dealing are ram-
pant.42  And then there are all the distortions that drawing those 
districts a strategic way—gerrymandering—brings.  
(noting that for the 2010 census cycle, Republicans will control redistricting in at 
least 195 districts, Democrats will control redistricting in 65, the parties will share 
control in 86, and nonpartisan commissions will control the process in 88 districts); 
see also Did the California Citizens Redistricting Commission Really Create More Com-
petitive Districts?, FAIR VOTE, http://www.fairvote.org/research-and-
analysis/blog/did-the-california-citizens-redistricting-commission-really-create-more-
competitive-districts/ (showing that California’s citizen redistricting commission had 
no effect on competitiveness of elections in California’s districts); John Avlon, Law-
makers Pledge to Reform, But Gerrymandering Keeps Getting Worse, THE DAILY BEAST 
(Mar. 19, 2012), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/02/19/lawmakers-
pledge-to-reform-but-gerrymandering-keeps-getting-worse.html (noting that Arizona’s 
governor tried to keep the state’s independent redistricting commission from drawing 
district lines that “elevated competitiveness over other goals.”) 
37 See Draper, supra note 21. 
38 See supra note 36; Justin Buchler, The Inevitability of Gerrymandering: Win-
ners and Losers Under Alternative Approaches to Redistricting, 5 DUKE J. CONST. L. & 
PUB. POL'Y 17, 18 (2010) (“Thus, all redistricting plans can be considered “gerryman-
ders” and an apolitical redistricting algorithm is impossible. Moreover, because the 
delegation of redistricting authority affects the algorithm that will be used, it follows 
that…the choice of delegation is itself a choice between winners and losers, and apo-
litical redistricting is fundamentally impossible.”); Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Fair Criteria 
and Procedures for Establishing Legislative Districts, in REPRESENTATION AND 
DISTRICTING ISSUES 7, 8 (Bernard Grofman et al. eds., 1982) (“There is a sort of vague 
impression...that something called nonpartisanship can be built into the districting 
process. My own experience tells me that although I may find nonpartisanship in 
heaven, in the real world...there are no nonpartisans….”). 
39 See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 267 (2004). 
40 See Rob Richie and Andrew Spencer, The Right Choice for Elections: How 
Choice Voting Will End Gerrymandering and Expand Minority Voting Rights, From City 
Councils to Congress, 47 U. RICH. L. REV. 959, 964 (2013) (discussing asymmetry in 
representation of winner-take-all voting systems). 
41 See Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973. 
42 See Avlon, supra note 36. 
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They say the road to hell is paved with good intentions, 
and single-member, winner-take-all districts prove the old adage 
true.  Single-member districts emerged as a more democratic 
means of choosing representatives than the at-large state elec-
tions that prevailed in the United States through the 1840s.43  
Under at-large systems, majorities swept every seat, leaving large 
portions of the electorate without a voice.44  Dividing at-large 
elections into smaller, single-member districts was intended to 
promote representation of these other viewpoints.45  But single-
member districts are not the only alternative to an at-large voting 
system.  And in today’s computerized world, they are not the 
most sensible choice. 
II. ABOLISH DISTRICTS 
To flush out the alternatives to single-member, winner-
take-all districts, let’s first take a closer look at the at-large elec-
tions they replaced.  In at-large elections, all candidates appear 
on a ballot together, and voters may cast as many votes as there 
are open seats.46  Thus, if a state has 5 congressional seats, vot-
ers in an at-large election could cast one vote each for up to 5 
candidates.  The top 5 vote-getters win the election.  Political 
parties operating under such a system typically offer a slate of 
candidates for that party, resulting in a landslide for the majority 
party in the state.47  As an example, New Jersey’s at-large elec-
tion for 6 House of Representatives seats in 1830 resulted in Re-
publicans winning all 6 seats, with vote totals ranging from 50-
52% of the popular vote.48  Democrats were completely shut out, 
despite winning around 49% of the vote.49   
The civil rights era showed that at-large elections were ef-
fective in denying representation not only to voters of minority 
parties, but to voters of minority races as well.  Indeed, federal 
legislation requiring the use of single-member districts arose in 
part as a response to efforts by Southern states to return to at-
large elections in order to deny racial minorities the power of 
their vote.50  Single-member districts could ensure representa-
tion of racial minorities by allowing for the creation of “majority-
minority” districts—districts drawn so that racial minorities 
could elect their candidate of choice.51  Despite the Supreme 
43 See Richie and Spencer, supra note 40, at 963. 
44 See id. at 964. 
45 See id. at 963-64. 
46 See id. at 962. 
47 See id. at 964. 
48 See id. 
49 See id. 
50 See id. at 965-67. 
51 See id. at 968, 971. 
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Court’s misgivings about race-based gerrymandering, majority-
minority districts remain the primary way of ensuring minority 
representation in Congress today.52  
But what an odd way to go.  Majority-minority districts 
rely on residential segregation to give racial minorities voice, 
which means minorities outside those geographic boundaries are 
out of luck.  These districts are also in deep tension with the in-
tegrative ideal of the civil rights movement,53 and at least accord-
ing to some, result in “token representation rather than real em-
powerment.”54  There’s got to be a better way. 
And there is.  Election reformers today are touting three 
modified at-large voting systems: limited voting, cumulative vot-
ing, and choice voting.55  All three abandon the notion of single-
member, winner-take-all districts, and thus all three have cer-
tain advantages.  No district lines to administrate, manipulate, 
litigate.  State-wide elections mean voters get more choice.  And 
eliminating the winner-take-all system gives voice to minority 
viewpoints (racial and otherwise).  Each system does so in a 
slightly different way. 
Limited voting offers a twist on at-large elections in that 
voters cannot cast as many votes as there are open seats.56  
Thus, in an election for 5 congressional seats, voters might be 
given only one vote (or two, or three, or four) rather than the 5 
they would get in an ordinary at-large election.  The more limited 
the votes, the less able the majority is to single-handedly deter-
mine the top 5 vote-getters for those seats.57  Majority voters will 
have to make choices, creating room for minority voters to influ-
ence election outcomes in their preferred way. 
Limited voting has been adopted to resolve dozens of vot-
ing rights challenges, and is commonly touted as an improve-
ment upon race-based districting.58  But it is not without down-
52 See id. at 968, 971; Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 657 (1993) (reviewing racial 
gerrymandering under strict scrutiny standard, even if drawn “for remedial purpos-
es”).  
53 See Dana R. Carstarphen, The Single Transferrable Vote: Achieving the Goals of 
Section 2 Without Sacrificing the Integration Ideal, 9 YALE L. & POL’Y REV.  405 (1991). 
54 Richard L. Engstrom, The Single Transferable Vote: An Alternative Remedy for 
Minority Vote Dilution, 27 UNIV. SAN. FRAN. L. REV. 781, 783 (1992).  See also Lani 
Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism:  The Voting Rights Act and a Theory of Black Elec-
toral Success, 89 MICH. L. R. 1077 (1991).  
55 See Modified At-Large Voting Systems, Center for Voting and Democracy: Fact-
sheet, FAIR VOTE, http://archive.fairvote.org/pr/ALmodified.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 
2014). 
56 See id.; Engstrom, supra note 54, at 784. 
57 See Engstrom, supra note 54, at 784. 
58 See Richie and Spencer, supra note 40, at 986, 988; Theodore S. Arrington 
and Gerald L. Ingalls, The Limited Vote Alternative to Affirmative Districting, 17 POL. 
GEO. 701 (1998), available at 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0962629897000693 (presenting 
statistical findings of the use of limited voting to resolve voting rights cases).  
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sides.  Limited voting invites strategic choices as voters consider 
where to spend their limited votes.  This dynamic is most easily 
seen where each voter has only one vote (although it is present in 
every limited voting system to some degree).  Under the one-vote 
scenario, rational voters might vote for their first choice candi-
date—but if they think their favorite will be one of the top vote-
getters anyway, they may throw their vote to a second, or even 
third-choice candidate instead.59  Limited voting also presents 
the possibility that where multiple candidates are vying for a mi-
nority group’s vote, the votes are too dispersed to elect even one 
of the minority group’s preferred candidates.60  In short, limited 
voting may increase the representation of minority viewpoints 
(and empirical work suggests that it does),61 but it does not solve 
the problem and creates new ones in its place. 
Cumulative voting aims to ameliorate the downsides of 
limited voting by allowing voters to cast as many votes as there 
are open seats, and more than one vote for any given candidate.  
Thus, in an election with 5 open seats, voters could cast one vote 
for five candidates, or five votes for one candidate, or any combi-
nation in between.62  Here again, the top 5 vote-getters win.  
Cumulative voting allows minority voters to stack their votes, in-
creasing their ability to influence the outcome of elections with-
out diluting the majority’s voting strength.63  Cumulative voting 
also reduces the need for strategic voting, as voters may distrib-
ute their votes among as many or few candidates as they de-
sire.64 
Like limited voting, cumulative voting has emerged as a 
preferred alternative to the creation of majority-minority districts 
in voting rights cases, and has proven successful in increasing 
59 The reverse is also true; where voters think their first choice may not garner 
enough votes, they may opt to spend their vote(s) on less desirable, but more viable, 
candidates instead. 
60 See Richie and Spencer, supra note 40, at 987 (“For example, suppose racial 
minority voters make up 25% of a jurisdiction that has a history of racially polarized 
voting and that uses limited voting or cumulative voting to elect a five-member city 
council. With a threshold of exclusion of 17%, either one or two of the minority vot-
ers’ candidates of choice should be elected. However, by running two candidates, they 
risk electing zero candidates of choice, because if the 25% vote is split evenly between 
the two candidates, neither would be elected.”). 
61 See Arrington and Ingalls, supra note 58, at 723 (“In the period before the im-
plementation of limited voting, 36% of all minority candidates won; in the period after 
limited voting 68% won.”).  
62 See Engstrom, supra note 54, at 784-85; see also Arrington and Ingalls, supra 
note 58, at 715 (noting that in a 7-seat race using cumulative voting, “if the voter 
chooses two candidates, then each one receives 3.5 votes”). 
63 See Engstrom, supra note 54, at 785. 
64 See Richard L. Engstrom, Is Cumulative Voting Too Complex?  Evidence From 
Exit Polls, 27 STET. L. REV. 813, 826-27 (1998).  
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the representation of minority viewpoints of all varieties.65  Even 
so, cumulative voting remains vulnerable to tactical voting and 
dilution where numerous candidates are vying for a particular 
group’s vote.66  In addition, cumulative voting may exacerbate a 
problem that limited voting has too—wasted votes.  In an election 
with 5 open seats, any candidate receiving 20% of the vote will 
qualify as one of the top 5 vote-getters.67  But in cumulative and 
limited voting systems, a candidate may receive 30, 40, even 
50% of the vote instead, wasting votes that could make a differ-
ence elsewhere and allowing for candidates who receive an ex-
tremely small portion of the vote, but who are still among the top 
5 vote-getters, to win a seat.  That’s why I prefer choice voting 
instead. 
Choice voting—also known as the “single transferrable 
vote” (STV)—allows voters to cast only one vote, but then allows 
that vote to transfer from candidate to candidate according to 
each voter’s order of preference.  Voters rank their candidates of 
choice, choosing as few or as many as they wish to potentially 
get their vote.  When a candidate reaches the threshold votes 
necessary to qualify as one of the top vote-getters in the election 
(again, roughly 20% of the vote in an election with 5 open 
seats),68 the candidate is declared a winner and all surplus votes 
beyond that threshold are transferred to voters’ second choice 
candidates.  If no candidate meets the winning threshold, then 
the last place candidate is eliminated and that candidate’s votes 
are transferred to voters’ next choice.  The counting and shuf-
fling process repeats until all open seats have been filled, which 
is why choice voting is also known as instant runoff voting.69  
Perhaps a simpler explanation from an election reform website 
would help: 
Each candidate puts out a box. 
A voter puts his ballot in his favorite candidate’s box. 
The ballots are counted.  
65 See Engstrom, supra note 54, at 788; Richie and Spencer, supra note 40, at 
986. 
66 See Engstrom, supra note 54, at 783 (“In a limited or cumulative voting elec-
tion . . . a dispersion of the minority vote across two or more minority  candidates 
could be fatal to the election of any minority candidate.”); Richie and Spencer, supra 
note 40, at 987 (“[B]oth cumulative voting and limited voting are vulnerable to issues 
with vote-splitting where too many like-minded candidates run.”). 
67 Actually, the percentage is slightly less than that, and slightly more complicat-
ed to figure out.  See infra note 68. 
68 See Single Transferable Vote, ACCURATE DEMOCRACY, 
http://www.accuratedemocracy.com/d_stv.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2014) (“To win 1 
of 5 seats requires the top rank on only one-fifth of the ballots or 20%.”).  But that’s a 
rough estimate; the actual number is calculated using the “Droop quota,” which is as 
follows:  Total votes/((number of seats) +1) + 1.  See Engstrom, supra note 54, at 788. 
69 Choice Voting, http://daviswiki.org/choice_voting (last visited Feb. 15, 2014). 
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If the box gets enough ballots, it wins. . . . 
If a round of counting ballots finds no winner, the box  
with the fewest votes is eliminated. Its ballots go to 
each voter’s next (2nd) choice . . . 
If a candidate gets more than enough votes, the extra 
votes got to each supporter’s next choice.70 
Choice voting is more complicated than limited and cumula-
tive voting systems, but those who have it say it’s easy enough to 
administer.71  Voters rank their candidates, votes get tallied, and 
computer software does the rest.72  
Choice voting is my preferred alternative universe for sev-
eral reasons.  First, it eliminates the strategy that plagues lim-
ited and cumulative voting systems.73  Voters can vote for their 
top choice without worrying that their vote will be wasted on 
candidates who either do not need it to win, or could not win 
even if they had it.  Second, choice voting minimizes the possibil-
ity that competition among minority candidates will knock them 
out of the running for a seat.74  Because votes are transferrable, 
voters can support a number of minority candidates in a single 
election, just not at the same time.  Third, choice voting maxim-
izes representation of the electorate.  Indeed, of the three modi-
fied at-large voting systems, choice voting is widely recognized as 
the most reliable way to ensure that election results reflect vot-
ers’ preferences.75   
70 Single Transferable Vote, supra note 68. 
71 Richie and Spencer, supra note 40, at 982, 985 (listing countries and munici-
palities that use choice voting and noting, “[C]hoice voting has repeatedly been used 
effectively by voters with a range of educational backgrounds.”); Carstarphen, supra 
note 53, at 426-27 (describing introduction of choice voting in Northern Ireland, 
where only 1.5% of votes cast in the first election were invalid, and concluding “The 
success of the STV voting system in Northern Ireland indicates that voters do not 
need to understand all of the complexities of the counting process. Voters can partic-
ipate successfully simply by ranking the candidates according to their preferences.”). 
72 See Single Transferable Vote, supra note 68. 
73 See Choice Voting, supra note 69 (concluding that strategic voting in choice 
voting “is much more difficult to exploit than in plurality or block voting.”).  This is 
not to say that choice voting  eliminates strategic behavior altogether. See Single 
Transferable Vote, supra note 68 (stating that “no preference voting system satisfies 
all the criteria in Arrow’s impossibility theorem”).  
74 See Engstrom, supra note 54, at 783 (“The vote transfer feature of STV allows 
a group of voters who support a set of candidates to differ internally over the prefera-
bility of specific candidates, without negating the group’s opportunity to elect a can-
didate within that set.”). 
75 See Richie and Spencer, supra note 40, at 981-82 (“Choice voting . . . is the 
most reliable of these three methods for accurately representing voters and upholding 
the principle of one person, one vote. Choice voting permits candidates or parties who 
receive less than majority support to receive some degree of representation.”); Modi-
fied At-Large Voting Systems, supra note 55 (“[P]reference voting is nearly guaranteed 
to provide fair results.”).  Choice voting is the election reform group FAIRVOTE’s 
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Given that this is a thought experiment, it is worth paus-
ing to consider what would happen if we abolished districts and 
replaced them with modified at-large elections using choice vot-
ing instead.  We have a pretty good idea as to how it would affect 
the representation of racial minorities.  Indeed, the success of 
choice voting in providing representation for racial and other mi-
norities has been the primary reason localities here in the United 
States have stopped using it.76  Of course, such representation 
would not rely on racially segregated districts, as is now the 
case.  But that means it would give voice to racial minorities out-
side those districts, where currently there is none, and that the 
focus would be on minority viewpoints, rather than venues—both 
of which I see as a good thing.  
We have some idea how choice voting would affect politi-
cal parties too.  Choice voting maximizes voters’ ability to elect 
the candidate of their choice, and thus cuts deeply into the pow-
er of parties.  No primaries and no safe seats means no party 
control of elections.  Indeed, choice voting needs no political par-
ties at all, although it can accommodate party slates and other 
forms of party participation.77  That said, not all parties would 
lose under choice voting.  Parties that presented a reasonable 
second or third choice candidate to voters  may well find en-
trance into the electoral market easier78—which is all the more 
reason both Democrats and Republicans would hate it.79   
But choice voting would be good for politics in a number 
of ways.  Candidates could win elections by being voters’ second 
or third choice picks as well as their first, which would incentiv-
ize moderate positions with bipartisan appeal and coalition-
building at most every turn.80  Minority candidates viewed as ex-
treme would find it difficult to attract second and third-
preference votes, forcing them to moderate their views or roll the 
choice.  See Choice Voting, FAIR VOTE, http://www.fairvote.org/reforms/fair-voting-
proportional-representation/choice-voting/ 
 (last visited Feb. 15, 2014). 
76 See Engstrom, supra note 54, at 795-97 (discussing Cincinnati’s 1957 deci-
sion to repeal choice voting after two African-Americans were elected to city council); 
Fair Voting in the United States, FAIR VOTE, http://www.fairvote.org/reforms/fair-
voting-proportional-representation/fair-voting-in-the-united-states/ (last visited Feb. 
15, 2014) (describing New York City’s decision to repeal choice voting during the Cold 
War after a member of the communist party was elected to city council in 1941). 
77 See Single Transferable Vote, supra note 68. 
78 See Douglas Amy, A Fair Voting System for the United States: Making the Case 
for Proportional Representation, FAIR VOTE (1993), 
http://archive.fairvote.org/reports/1993/amy.html  
79 See Arrington and Ingalls, supra note 58, at 711 (“Since it might pose a genu-
ine threat to the duopoly of the Democrats and Republicans, we would expect it to be 
vigorously opposed by unanimous votes in legislative assemblies across the US.”). 
80 See Choice Voting, FAIR VOTE, supra note 75. 
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dice that they have the numbers to earn a seat on their own.81  
And the results of choice voting, which approximate the distribu-
tion of the vote, mean that our representative democracy would 
be more, well, representative. 
We would likely see campaigning change too.  In the ab-
sence of safe seats, candidates could not be complacent and 
would need to reach a broad audience.  That would likely in-
crease the cost of political campaigns, although maybe not given 
that candidates would need a threshold number of votes, rather 
than a majority, to win, and would likely pool resources by run-
ning with others on a party slate.  Regardless, it would likely 
change the nature of campaigning itself, as candidates looking to 
pick up other candidates’ votes would find negative campaigning 
less efficacious.82 
Choice voting would also encourage higher voter turnout.  
Indeed, elections that use choice voting routinely see voter turn-
outs of over 80%—a far cry from the 35-40% range we see year 
after year in congressional elections.83  In part, more voters vote 
under choice voting because they have more choices to consider, 
and thus a better chance of finding a candidate they actually 
like.  And in part, more voters vote because they know their vote 
actually matters.   
In the United States, the challenge is not only voter turn-
out, but voter ignorance as well,84 and how that would play out 
under choice voting is a hard question.  There’s a good chance 
that apathetic voters would just vote their party’s slate—and if 
that happened, a state that ran 65% Republican and 35% Demo-
crat would yield election results approximating those percent-
ages.85  That, along with the moderating effect of transferrable 
voting, strikes me as a vast improvement to the patently anti-
democratic election results we have now.  That said, one could 
imagine that over time, American voters would not just vote their 
party’s slate.  The availability of choices may well pique their in-
terest in learning about those choices as well.86 
81 See Single Transferable Vote (STV), ELECTORAL REFORM SOC’Y, 
http://www.electoral-reform.org.uk/?PageID=483  (last visited Feb. 14, 2014).  
82 See id.  
83 See Amy, supra note 78. For national voter turnout rates in congressional and 
presidential elections, see National Voter Turnout in Federal Elections: 1960 - 2012, 
INFOPLEASE, http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0781453.html (last visited Feb. 15, 
2014). 
84 See Corinna Barrett Lain, Upside Down Judicial Review, 101 GEO. L. J. 113, 
154 (2012) (discussing voter ignorance and apathy). 
85 See Richie and Spencer, supra note 40, at 984, 995. 
86 American voters are “rationally ignorant”—that is, they typically do not invest 
in information about candidates because they conclude that it would cost them more 
in time, energy, etc. than their vote is worth.  See Lain, supra note 84, at 154.  If vot-
ers knew their vote mattered, that would change the calculation (although how much 
it would change is hard to say).  
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Finally, there are legitimate questions about the impact 
choice voting would have on the representation itself.  Here lies 
the biggest challenge for choice voting, if only because our reign-
ing assumption is that representation ought to be geographically 
defined.  But why is that necessarily so?  Senators represent 
statewide populations and we don’t think they are ineffectual for 
that reason (other reasons, maybe, but not that one).  And under 
the winner-take-all, single-member district approach we have 
now, minority party voters have a representative for their district, 
but that representative does not represent their views.  Scholar-
ship in this area has long recognized that representation is more 
about communities of interest than neighborhoods, and that it is 
increasingly the case that spatial proximity is a weak proxy for 
similar interests, concerns, and views.87  That said, there is 
nothing about choice voting that prevents voters who care about 
geography from using that as a criterion in their voting prefer-
ences—just as there is nothing that prevents candidates from 
running campaigns that cater to particular urban, rural, or other 
geographically-defined communities’ views.88 
Maybe that’s not the problem.  My colleague Hank Cham-
bers has argued that geographically-defined districts are im-
portant because they allow for a “real or perceived relationship 
between a representative and her constituency to flourish,” 
which in turn “facilitates the ability of the representative to rep-
resent her constituency and allows the constituency to hold the 
representative accountable for her actions.”89  He’s got a point.  
In a modified at-large system, voters don’t have one representa-
tive who is theirs and theirs alone, and representatives don’t 
know who exactly voted them into office.  But in my mind, 
there’s no flourishing relationship between representatives and 
their constituencies now; as I’ve already discussed, the relation-
ship that matters in single-member districts is with the ideologi-
cal activists who form the party base.  Moreover, I’m not sure 
whether modified at-large systems render the relationship be-
tween representatives and the general public less accountable 
and responsive, or more.  Advocates of choice voting say the lat-
ter is true—that voters have a greater connection to those they 
think they helped vote into office, and that choice allows them to 
develop relationships naturally with those who tend to most 
closely approximate their views.90  
87 See Arrington and Ingalls, supra note 58, at 707. 
88 See Richard L. Engstrom, Cumulative and Limited Voting: Minority Electoral 
Opportunities and More, 30 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 97, 114 (2010). 
89 Henry L. Chambers, Jr., Enclave Districting, 8 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 135, 
178, 182 (1999). I highly recommend this piece as an innovative attempt to have both 
communities of interest and geographical ties. 
90 See Single Transferable Vote (STV), supra note 81. 
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I suppose the real answer is that we just don’t know.  But 
the problem with the single-member district system we have now 
is that we do know.  We know which candidate will win because 
the districts are rigged beforehand.  We know which parties con-
trol which districts.  We know the current system pushes candi-
dates to the political extremes.  And we know that the results of 
our elections are patently undemocratic. 
We ought to abolish districts.  We really should.  The hard 
part is figuring out how something like that might possibly hap-
pen.  
III. HOW IT MIGHT HAPPEN 
Let’s be real.  Congress is not going to abolish districts.  I 
can’t imagine that state legislatures are much interested in the 
enterprise either.  It’s a safe bet that our political parties will not 
support the idea.  And the Supreme Court?  Forget about it.  The 
Justices cannot even figure out whether the most tortured ex-
amples of gerrymandering are justiciable.91   
Abolishing districts is a fight that election reform groups 
like FairVote (which has done incredible work in this area) are 
going to have to take to The People Themselves.92  And what if 
they did?  It’s not inconceivable that an election reform referen-
dum would make a state’s ballot.  Some already have.93  Tired of 
waiting for courts to police the political process and knowing full 
well that the political process is not going to police itself, good 
government groups have increasingly turned directly to the peo-
ple to circumvent entrenched self-interest in passing democratic 
reforms.  And they could do so with choice voting initiatives too. 
91 See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 267 (2004). 
92 See LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND 
JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004).    
93 See, e.g., Proposition 11: Redistricting State of California (Nov. 26, 2008),  
http://www.smartvoter.org/2008/11/04/ca/state/prop/11/ (providing results of 
referendum removing authority to redistrict California from elected officials to citi-
zen’s panel); Eric Russell, Mainers Vote to Continue Election Day Registration, BANGOR 
DAILY NEWS (Nov. 8, 2011, 9:46 PM), 
http://bangordailynews.com/2011/11/08/politics/early-results-indicate-election-
day-voter-registration-restored/ (reporting results of referendum vote in Maine to 
“overturn a recently passed law that would have ended a 38-year old practice of al-
lowing voters to register on Election Day”); Jim Siegel, GOP, Democrats Close to Elec-
tion-Law Deal, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Apr. 26, 2012, 6:09 AM), 
http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2012/04/26/gop-democrats-are-
close-to-election-law-deal.html (discussing Ohio referendum to repeal “a GOP-crafted 
election-law overhaul” and fight over whether GOP could repeal legislation); See Josh 
Israel, Arizona Citizens Force Referedum on GOP Voter Suppression Bill, Halting the 
Bill For Now, THINK PROGRESS (Oct. 30, 2013, 11:05 AM), 
http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2013/10/30/2859201/arizona-voting-
suppression-referendum/ (discussing referendum challenging bill passed by “Arizo-
na’s GOP-controlled legislature…designed to make it harder for citizens to vote and 
for candidates to get on the ballot.”). 
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Except they can’t.  The problem is not the United States 
Constitution (thankfully).  Article 1, Section 2 provides that rep-
resentatives for the House “shall be apportioned among the sev-
eral States which may be included within this Union, according 
to their respective Numbers,” but does not require single-
member districts.   
The problem is federal law.  Since 1967, federal legislation 
has required that states establish “a number of districts equal to 
the number of Representatives to which such State is so entitled, 
and . . . no district to elect more than one Representative.”94  
Federal law requires single-member, winner-take-all districts. 
As previously noted, federal legislation requiring the use 
of single-member districts arose in part as a response to at-
tempts by Southern states to deprive racial minorities the power 
of their vote.95  The timing was no fortuity.  Southern states in 
the 1960s were seeing many of the devices traditionally used to 
disenfranchise African Americans—poll taxes, literacy tests, and 
the like—either declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court 
or made illegal by the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA).96  In the 
wake of these actions, Southern states turned to at-large voting 
instead, and Congress responded by taking that move off the ta-
ble. 
So there it stands.  Federal law prevents states from even 
considering choice voting (or other modified at-large voting sys-
tems) as a solution to the problems that single-member districts 
have wrought; states couldn’t enact such reforms even if they 
wanted to.  Apparently, Congress considered changing this rule 
15 years ago with the proposed States’ Choice of Voting Systems 
Act, but it died in committee.97  Let’s be real.  Congress is not go-
ing to abolish districts. 
But I don’t think it has to because in my mind, the prohi-
bition is unconstitutional, and even a wary Supreme Court has 
good reason to agree.  As both the VRA and the Supreme Court 
have made clear, there is no right to proportional representa-
tion.98  There is no right by statute and there is no right under 
the Constitution.  But that’s an entirely different proposition 
94 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2. 
95 See supra text accompanying note 50. 
96 See Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (invalidating 
the poll tax); Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973. 
97 See The States’ Choice of Voting Systems Act (HR 1173), FAIRVOTE, 
http://archive.fairvote.org/library/statutes/scvsa99/index.html (discussing bill and 
providing links to discussion, testimony, and text); HR 1173, Library of Congress, 
106th Congress (1999-2000), http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquery/z?d106:h.r.01173 (providing bill summary and status). 
98 See 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (“. . . nothing in this section establishes a right to have 
members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the 
population.”).  
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from what federal law currently provides—that states cannot 
adopt voting systems that yield approximately proportional re-
sults, even if they want to.   
As a point of clarification, none of the modified at-large 
systems I have discussed—not choice voting, not limited voting, 
not cumulative voting—guarantee proportional representation.  
Choice voting comes closest to yielding those results, but votes 
are for candidates, not parties or populations, and the results 
depend on how people vote.  No one is guaranteed anything, ex-
cept the power of his or her vote.  What choice voting does is 
yield results that most accurately reflect voters’ preferences.  
How can it possibly be constitutional for Congress to take that 
option off the states’ table?  
I could drag out the same arguments others have used in 
a feeble attempt to constitutionally regulate gerrymandering.  
“The right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or dilution 
of the weight of a citizen’s vote just as effectively as by wholly 
prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise,” wrote the Supreme 
Court in Reynolds v. Sims.99  Um, yeah.  And anyone who didn’t 
believe that in 1964 should need no convincing now.  The “one 
person, one vote” principle may not prohibit uberpartisan gerry-
mandering, but neither does it allow Congress to prohibit sys-
tems that best effectuate its mandate. 
One can get to the same place based on Section 2 of the 
VRA, which prohibits “any electoral system that results in dis-
crimination, irrespective of intent.”100  In fact, Justice Thomas is 
already there (and has been for twenty years), noting that there 
is no reason that “a geographically dispersed minority cannot 
challenge districting itself as a dilutive electoral practice.”101  
While I happen to agree with Justice Thomas on this one—
majority-minority districts do nothing to protect minorities out-
side those districts, and the nature of single-member districts 
systematically denies voice to minority voters of all varieties—one 
need not to go that far.  The VRA (and Equal Protection Clause, 
Due Process Clause, First Amendment, and every other constitu-
tional provision being thrown at the gerrymandering problem) 
may not require a particular solution, but neither do they allow 
Congress to take viable solutions off the table.  And that’s exactly 
99 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964); see also Wesberry v. Sanders, 
376 U.S. 1, 18 (1964) (While it may not be possible to draw congressional districts 
with mathematical precision, that is no excuse for ignoring our Constitution’s plain 
objective of making equal representation for equal numbers of people the fundamen-
tal goal of the House of Representatives. That is the high standard of justice and 
common sense which the Founders set for us.”). 
100 42 U.S.C. § 1973. 
101 Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 784, 911 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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what the federal mandate of single-member, winner-take-all dis-
tricts does. 
The key to my claim is what I’m not asking the Supreme 
Court to do, and that’s why I think even a Court disinclined to 
enter political thickets would be willing to tip-toe around the 
edge of this one.  Invalidating the federal mandate of single-
member districts does nothing more than remove the barrier that 
keeps states from considering innovative solutions on their own.  
It does not require the Court to regulate redistricting plans.  It 
does not require the Court to adopt judicially manageable stand-
ards.  It does not require the Court to take a position on any 
electoral system at all.  That said, Justice Thomas is surely right 
in noting that “there is no principle inherent in our constitution-
al system, or even in the history of the Nation’s electoral practice, 
that makes single-member districts the ‘proper’ mechanism for 
electing representatives to governmental bodies.”102  As previous-
ly noted, multi-member districts were common until the 
1840s,103 which should give even originalists pause in thinking 
about Congress’s power to prohibit states from considering mul-
ti-district electoral reform options. 
In the end, I’m back to where I started.  We should abol-
ish districts.  And the first step in that process is invalidating the 
federal statute that prohibits states from doing so, which should 
not be a hard call even for our current Supreme Court.  The rest 
is up to us. 
 
102 Holder, 512 U.S. at 898 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
103 See supra text accompanying note 43; see also Holder, 512 U.S. at 897-98 
(Thomas, J., concurring) (“[F]rom the earliest days of the Republic, multimember dis-
tricts were a common feature of our political systems.”). 
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ABOLISH DISTRICTS - APPENDIX  
 Maryland’s 3rd Congressional District          Maryland’s 4th Congressional District    
 Illinois’ 4th Congressional District                      Illinois’ 11th Congressional District                          
       North Carolina’s 2nd Congressional District            North Carolina’s 12th Congressional District      
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        North Carolina’s 13th Congressional District           Pennsylvania’s 3rd Congressional District       
  Pennsylvania’s 6th Congressional District                    Pennsylvania’s 12th Congressional District                                 
         Texas’ 19th Congressional District                                               Texas’ 29th Congressional District  
